

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In re application of: Jeffries et al.	§	
	§	Group Art Unit: 2139
Serial No. 10/733,713	§	
	§	Examiner: Wang, Harris C.
Filed: December 11, 2003	§	
	§	
For: Efficient Method for Providing	§	
Secure Remote Access	§	

Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

37945
PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE
CUSTOMER NUMBER

APPEAL BRIEF (37 C.F.R. 41.37)

This brief is in furtherance of the Notice of Appeal, filed in this case on November 15, 2007.

A fee of \$510.00 is required for filing an Appeal Brief. Please charge this fee to IBM Corporation Deposit Account No. 09-0457. No additional fees are believed to be necessary. If, however, any additional fees are required, I authorize the Commissioner to charge these fees which may be required to IBM Corporation Deposit Account No. 09-0457. No extension of time is believed to be necessary. If, however, an extension of time is required, the extension is requested, and I authorize the Commissioner to charge any fees for this extension to IBM Corporation Deposit Account No. 09-0457.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The real party in interest in this appeal is the following party: International Business Machines Corporation of Armonk, New York.

RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

With respect to other appeals or interferences that will directly affect, or be directly affected by, or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal, there are no such appeals or interferences.

STATUS OF CLAIMS

A. TOTAL NUMBER OF CLAIMS IN APPLICATION

Claims in the application are: 1-24

B. STATUS OF ALL THE CLAIMS IN APPLICATION

1. Claims canceled: 2-8, 10-16, and 18-24
2. Claims withdrawn from consideration but not canceled: NONE
3. Claims pending: 1, 9, and 17
4. Claims allowed: NONE
5. Claims rejected: 1, 9, and 17
6. Claims objected to: NONE

C. CLAIMS ON APPEAL

The claims on appeal are: 1, 9, and 17

STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

The claim amendments, presented in the Final Office Action dated November 12, 2007, were entered.

SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

A. CLAIM 1 - INDEPENDENT

The subject matter of claim 1 is directed to a computer network (300) comprising a client (100, 200, 304, 404, 604) and a server (100, 200, 302, 406, 606) connected by a network connection (102, 206, 210, 222) (see *Specification*, page 9, lines 4-9 and 23-27; and on page 10, lines 1-6). The client has a userid and a password associated with the client (see *Specification*, page 10, lines 18-19; on page 11, lines 1-3; on page 12, line 9; on page 13, lines 12-15; and on page 14, lines 23-25). The client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18; and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5). The first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18; and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5; and **steps 504, 506 of Figure 5** and **steps 704, 706 of Figure 7**). The server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 10-21; on page 12, line 15-20; on page 13, lines 19-24; and on page 15, lines 5-11; **steps 508, 510 of Figure 5** and **steps 708, 710 of Figure 7**). The server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 12-20; on page 12, line 18-19; on page 13, lines 20-22; and on page 15, lines 8-9; and **step 510 of Figure 5** and **step 708 of Figure 7**). The first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 12-20; on page 12, lines 18-19; on page 13, lines 20-22; and on page 15, line 8-9; and **step 510 of Figure 5** and **step 708 of Figure 7**). The client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 21-26; on page 12, lines 21-23; on page 13, lines 25 through page 14, line 1; and on page 15, line 11-13; and **steps 512, 514, 516 of Figure 5** and **steps 712, 714, 716 of Figure 7**). The server verifies the received server-generated random value

from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server (see *Specification*, on page 12, lines 1-4; on page 12, line 23 through page 13, line 2; on page 14, lines 1-4; and on page 15, line 14-19; and **steps 518, 522, 524 of Figure 5** and **steps 718, 722, 724 of Figure 7**). The client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server (see *Specification*, page 12, 5-7; page 13, lines 3-4; and on page 14, lines 5-7; and **step 526 of Figure 5** and **step 726 of Figure 7**). If the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result, and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 7-16; and on page 15, lines 20-26; and **steps 726, 728, 730 of Figure 7**). The server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 17-19; and on page 16, lines 1-12; and **step 738 of Figure 7**). The server verifies the received message authentication code (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 19-21; and on page 16, lines 1-12; and **steps 732, 734, 736, 738 of Figure 7**). If the received message authentication code is verified, the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 21-22; and on page 16, lines 8-12; and **step 740 of Figure 7**).

B. CLAIM 9 - INDEPENDENT

The subject matter of claim 9 is directed to a computer program product (**300**) in a computer readable medium, comprising a client (**100, 200, 304, 404, 604**) and a server (**100, 200, 302, 406, 606**) connected by a network connection (**102, 206, 210, 222**) (see *Specification*, page 9, lines 4-9 and 23-27; and on page 10, lines 1-6). The client has a userid and a password associated with the client (see *Specification*, page 10, lines 18-19; on page 11, lines 1-3; on page 12, line 9; on page 13, lines 12-15; and on page 14, lines 23-25). The computer program product provides first instructions whereby the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18;

and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5; and **steps 504, 506 of Figure 5** and **steps 704, 706 of Figure 7**). The first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18; and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5; and **steps 504, 506 of Figure 5** and **steps 704, 706 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides second instructions whereby the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 10-21; on page 12, line 15-20; on page 13, lines 19-24; and on page 15, lines 5-11; **steps 508, 510 of Figure 5** and **steps 708, 710 of Figure 7**). The server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 12-20; on page 12, line 18-19; on page 13, lines 20-22; and on page 15, lines 8-9; and **step 510 of Figure 5** and **step 708 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides third instructions whereby the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 10-21; on page 12, line 15-20; on page 13, lines 19-24; and on page 15, lines 5-11; **steps 508, 510 of Figure 5** and **steps 708, 710 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides fourth instructions whereby the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server (see *Specification*, on page 12, lines 1-4; on page 12, line 23 through page 13, line 2; on page 14, lines 1-4; and on page 15, line 14-19; and **steps 518, 522, 524 of Figure 5** and **steps 718, 722, 724 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides fifth instructions whereby the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server (see *Specification*, page 12, 5-7; page 13, lines 3-4; and on page 14, lines 5-7; and **step 526 of Figure 5** and **step 726 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides sixth instructions whereby

if the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result, and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 7-16; and on page 15, lines 20-26; and **steps 726, 728, 730 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides seventh instructions whereby the server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result, and the server verifies the received message authentication code (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 17-19; and on page 16, lines 1-12; and **step 738 of Figure 7**). The computer program product provides eighth instructions whereby the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password if the received message authentication code is verified (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 21-22; and on page 16, lines 8-12; and **step 740 of Figure 7**).

C. CLAIM 17 - INDEPENDENT

The subject matter of claim 17 is directed to a method of authenticating a client (**100, 200, 304, 404, 604**) with a server (**100, 200, 302, 406, 606**) across a network connection (**102, 206, 210, 222**) (see *Specification*, on page 5, lines 3-19; on page 9, lines 4-9 and 23-27; and on page 10, lines 1-6). The client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18; and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5; and **steps 504, 506 of Figure 5** and **steps 704, 706 of Figure 7**). The first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 3-9; on page 12, line 9-14; on page 13, lines 15-18; and on page 14, line 25, through page 15, line 5; and **steps 504, 506 of Figure 5** and **steps 704, 706 of Figure 7**). The server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends on at least a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 10-21; on page 12, line 15-20; on page 13, lines 19-24; and on page 15, lines 5-11; **steps 508, 510 of Figure 5** and **steps 708, 710 of Figure 7**). The server generates the challenge token by

exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 12-20; on page 12, line 18-19; on page 13, lines 20-22; and on page 15, lines 8-9; and **step 510 of Figure 5** and **step 708 of Figure 7**). The client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and a userid of the client to the server (see *Specification*, on page 11, lines 10-21; on page 12, line 15-20; on page 13, lines 19-24; and on page 15, lines 5-11; **steps 508, 510 of Figure 5** and **steps 708, 710 of Figure 7**). The server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if the server-generated random value from the client is verified by the server, a one-time authentication token is generated by the server and the server sends the one-time authentication token to the client to thereby give the client permission to access the server (see *Specification*, on page 12, lines 1-4; on page 12, line 23 through page 13, line 2; on page 14, lines 1-4; and on page 15, line 14-19; and **steps 518, 522, 524 of Figure 5** and **steps 718, 722, 724 of Figure 7**). The client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server (see *Specification*, page 12, 5-7; page 13, lines 3-4; and on page 14, lines 5-7; and **step 526 of Figure 5** and **step 726 of Figure 7**). If the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creates a mask, computes a message authentication code, and exclusive-ors the mask with the new digest to form a result and the client sends the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 7-16; and on page 15, lines 20-26; and **steps 726, 728, 730 of Figure 7**). The server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result. The server verifies the received message authentication code (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 17-19; and on page 16, lines 1-12; and **step 738 of Figure 7**). If the received message authentication code is verified, the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password (see *Specification*, page 14, lines 21-22; and on page 16, lines 8-12; and **step 740 of Figure 7**).

GROUND OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

The grounds of rejection to review on appeal are as follows:

A. GROUND OF REJECTION 1 (Claims 1, 9, and 17)

The Final Office Action rejects claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter, which applicants regard as the invention.

B. GROUND OF REJECTION 1 (Claims 1, 9, and 17)

The Final Office Action rejects claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over *Peyravian et al.*, “Method for Protecting Password Transmission”, Computers and Security, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp.466-469, 2000, hereinafter referred to as *Peyravian*, in view of *Trostle* (U.S. Patent Number 6,718,467).

ARGUMENT

A. GROUND OF REJECTION 1 (Claims 1, 9, and 17)

The Final Office Action rejects claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter, which applicants regard as the invention. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

The Final Office Action states:

The claims disclose that a first set of values includes ("a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number and a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one"). However, the specification (pg. 11) and the drawings (Fig. 7A, 706), disclose a client generated random value (rc) a large prime number (p) a primitive root (g) and the primitive root *raised to the power of a random integer less than the large prime number minus one*.

It is unclear whether the Applicant intends on claiming sending the large integer x, or the calculated value g^x in the claim language.

Final Office Action dated August 16, 2007, pages 2-3.

Claims 1, 9, and 17 were amended in the Response to Final Office Action, dated November 12, 2007, by replacing the phrase "a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one" with the phrase "the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one" to correct the error in the claims, as disclosed in the specification and indicated by the Examiner. The Examiner has entered these after final amendments. Therefore, Applicants respectfully submit that the rejection of claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, has been overcome.

B. GROUND OF REJECTION 1 (Claims 1, 9, and 17)

The Final Office Action rejects claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over *Peyravian et al.*, "Method for Protecting Password Transmission", Computers and Security, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp.466-469, 2000, hereinafter referred to as *Peyravian*, in view of *Trostle* (U.S. Patent Number 6,718,467). This rejection is respectfully traversed.

With respect to independent claims 1, 9, and 17, the Final Office Action states:

Regarding Claim 1,

Peyravian teaches the computer network, comprising: a client and a server connected by a network connection,

wherein the client has a userid and a password associated with the client (*"The user submits his userid (id) and password (pw) to the client" pg. 4*);

wherein the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server (*"The client generates a random value (rc) and sends id and rc to the server" pg.4*);

wherein the server responds to the client by generating a first random value and sending the token to the client; (*"The server generates a random value (rs) and sends it to the client" pg. 4*). *The Examiner interprets the nonce (rs) as the token.*

the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest ($idpw_digest_new = Hash(id, new_pw)$, pg. 6, *Peyravian*),

creating a mask ($auth_token_mask$, pg. 7, *Peyravian*), computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result ($protected_idpw_new = protected_idpw_new XOR auth_token_mask$, pg. 7, *Peyravian*)

and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server; (*"The client sends id, auth_token, and protected_idpw_digest_new to the server" pg. 7, Peyravian*)

wherein the server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result (*"To retrieve idpw_digest_new, the server generates auth_token_mask ... and XORs it with the received protected_idpw_digest_new" pg. 7, Peyravian*), and wherein the server verifies the received message authentication code,

and wherein if the received message authentication code is verified, the server changes the client password. (*"If it is valid, the server sends a message to the client accepting the password change"*, pg. 7, *Peyravian*).

It is inherent that if the password is changed, the old password will be replaced with a new password.

Peyravian does not teach wherein the first set of values including a first random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one,

or where the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the first random value with a first hash, wherein the first hash is a hash of the following: a primitive root of a large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and a second random value.

Peyravian further does not teach wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server;

wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the first random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the first random number.

Trostle teaches a password based protocol using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange. ("by using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange and C's private key only to sign this exchange, a much better level of security is achieved" Column 2, lines 23-25). Trostle teaches that "Diffie-Hellman key exchange, there are two publicly known numbers: a prime number p and an integer g that is a primitive root of p " (Column 4, lines 24-26). Trostle teaches generating a challenge by using a calculated shared key ($Dhkey_2 = X_2^{s_2} \bmod p$) to encrypt a hashed password digest ($h(k(P'))$), a first random value s' , and a random value c . Trostle further teaches that the first generated value s is returned and "upon receipt of message, C uses Dhkey to decrypt the message, obtaining, s' and Y_3 , C uses s' to authenticate S." (Column 6, lines 36-38). This authentication is done by comparing s' to the value that C originally generated and stored. ("C generates and stores random values c' and s'' ", Column 6, lines 14-15)

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the password changing system in Peyravian with the Diffie-Hellman key based password system of Trostle.

The motivation is that Trostle teaches a known way of using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for key exchange to change passwords. Trostle describes the motivation and steps for changing passwords in Column 6, lines 1-38.

The combined references of Peyravian and Trostle still do not explicitly teach sending a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and primitive root raised to a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one. The combined references also do not explicitly teach wherein the challenge token comprises a server generated random value XORed with a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client generated random value, and then have the server generate a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify Trostle to first send a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a large random integer, and to further include a challenge of a server generated random value XORed with a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client generated random value and then have the server generate a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token.

The motivation is a large prime number, a primitive root and a primitive root raised to a large number are all necessary for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, sending these values from a client to a server would have been within the skill of

one in the art. The motivation to use a challenge token is that although Trostle uses the shared secret to encrypt, the password digest, first random value s' and the random value c , while the Applicant describes a challenge token that uses the random value s XORed with the hash of the shared secret, password digest and random value c , it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to generate a challenge using the challenge token for the following reasons.

In both cases the sender gives the receiver the necessary unencrypted value $(Cid, [c, s', h(c'), h(k(P'))]Dhkey, X_2$ Column 6, line 19 of Trostle, g^z of the Application) to generate the shared key. Once the shared key (Dhkey) is generated, the receiver can then "unlock" the remaining values. In Trostle, the Dhkey, is used to decrypt the random values, where as in the instant application, a hash is calculated using the generated shared key along with other values known by the client and then the hash is XORed with another random values used to authenticate.

As described in the previous office action the use of one-time pads and MACs are very well known in the art. (Searchsecurity.com and ATIS). The combination of Peravian and Trostle included each element as claimed (random value s' , random value c , g^{\wedge} integer, password digest). The Examiner believes that one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods, such as using a Message Authentication Code and a one-time pad. Furthermore one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.

Finally, the Examiner interprets generating a one-time authentication token, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time token as repeating the steps of the challenge token and subsequent authentication. One of ordinary skill in the art would be able to duplicate the steps.

Regarding the computer program product and the method associated with the computer network above, the method is already included in the cited sections and it is inherent that a password changing system on a computer network requires a computer program product on a computer readable medium.

Final Office Action dated August 16, 2007, pages 4-9.

Claim 1, which is representative of the other rejected independent claims 9 and 17 with regard to similarly recited subject matter, reads as follows:

1. A computer network, comprising:
a client and a server connected by a network connection, wherein the client has a userid and a password associated with the client;
wherein the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one;
wherein the server responds to the client by generating a one-time

challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value;

wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server;

wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server;
wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server;

wherein if the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result, and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server;

wherein the server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result, and wherein the server verifies the received message authentication code; and

wherein if the received message authentication code is verified, the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password. (emphasis added)

The Examiner bears the burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness based on the prior art when rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103. *In re Fritch*, 972 F.2d 1260, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For an invention to be *prima facie* obvious, the prior art must teach or suggest all claim limitations. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1974). “All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.” *In re Wilson*, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970).

Peyravian and *Trostle*, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest that “the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one; wherein the server responds to the client by generating a

one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value; wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server; wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server," as recited in independent claims 1, 9, and 17. Therefore, the Examiner has not established a *prima facie* case of obviousness based on the prior art when rejecting claims 1, 9, and 17.

Peyravian is directed to methods for protecting password transmission. The presently claimed invention refers to the cited *Peyravian* reference on page 3, of the specification and states that the schemes, such as in the cited *Peyravian* reference, do not provide protection against the offline password-guessing attack (i.e. dictionary attack) and denial of service attack. The claims of the present invention provide an improved method that provides this protection. In the cited *Peyravian* reference, the client only sends a userid and a client-generated random value when requesting access to the server and the server responds by sending a server-generated random value. The cited *Peyravian* reference does not provide the additional features and steps of claims 1, 9, and 17. *Peyravian* does not teach or suggest that "the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one; wherein the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password,

and the client-generated random value; wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server; wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server," as recited in independent claims 1, 9, and 17. In addition, *Trostle* does not provide for the deficiencies of *Peyravian*. Thus, *Peyravian* and *Trostle*, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest these features.

In addition with respect to *Peyravian*, the Examiner alleges in the Examiner's Answer, dated November 21, 2007, that Figures 2 and 3 of *Peyravian* match up closely to Figures 4 and 6 of the present invention, with the exception of the inclusion of the terms (p, g, g^x, g^y) . Appellants respectfully disagree. The present invention includes additional steps for both the client and the server when authenticating a client with a server across a network connection. In addition to not including the values p, g, g^x, g^y , *Peyravian* does not teach that the server responds to the client after receiving the first set of values by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client. *Peyravian* does not teach that the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value. To the contrary, *Peyravian* merely sends a server-generated random value in response to receiving a userid and client-generated random value. Also in the present invention, additional steps include that the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server; and then the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number. If the server-generated random value, received from the client, is verified by the server, then the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server. To the contrary, *Peyravian* does not teach these additional steps as claimed in the present invention. In addition,

Trostle does not provide for the deficiencies of *Peyravian*. Thus, *Peyravian* and *Trostle*, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest these features.

Trostle is directed to a method for a first participant to establish a shared secret with a second participant, where the first participant and the second participant share a password-based first master key and a hash function includes sending a first message including a first private value for the second participant and a first authenticator for the second participant encrypted with the first master key. The first message also includes a first hashed authenticator for the first participant encrypted with a first shared secret key. The first message also includes a first public value for the first participant. The first participant receives a second message, the second message including the first authenticator for the second participant and a first public value for the second participant encrypted with the first shared secret key. The first participant sends a third message, the third message including the first authenticator for the first participant, a second hashed authenticator for the first participant, a second authenticator for the second participant and a second master key encrypted with a second shared secret key. The third message also includes a second public value for the first participant. A fourth message is received by the first participant, the fourth message including a second authenticator for the second participant and a second public value for the second participant encrypted with the second shared secret key. *Trostle* does not teach or suggest that “the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one; wherein the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client’s userid and password, and the client-generated random value; wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server; wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server’s stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and

sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server,” as recited in independent claims 1, 9, and 17. In addition, *Trostle* does not provide for the deficiencies of *Peyravian*. Thus, *Peyravian* and *Trostle*, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest these features.

Trostle teaches a different password based protocol for secure communications between two parties who share a relatively insecure secret. In *Trostle*, prior to beginning a message exchange the two parties share knowledge of the secret password, a one-way hash function, an encryption key, another key, a publicly known prime number, and a publicly known primitive root of the prime number. The message exchange is separated into three stages: the “Setup Initial State” stage, the “Generate New Password” stage, and the “Normal Exchange” stage. The “Generate New Password” stage referred to in the rejection of claims 1, 9, and 17 is described in *Trostle* as follows:

Generate New Password

The initial exchange of messages 104 and 106 is vulnerable to a password chaining attack. This is because if an attacker correctly guesses K , he can obtain y_1 and use both y_1 and X_1 to generate $DHkey_1$. The attacker may then compare s in message 104 with s in message 106. If the two values are the same, the attacker knows he has obtained the correct $DHkey_1$ and can therefore decrypt subsequent messages. Therefore, according to the present invention, the master password is changed. If the principle is a user, the user is prompted to enter a new password (P'). If the principle is a process, the process generates its own new password. When C 100 has P' , it computes and stores a new master key $h(k(P'))$. Additionally, C 100 generates and stores random values c' and s' and Diffie-Hellman pair (x_2, X_2) . C 100 also calculates $DHkey_2 = X_2^{y_2} \bmod p$. C 100 then sends

Cid, $[c, s', h(c'), h(k(P'))]$ $DHkey_2, X_2$ (msg.108)
to S 102 at reference numeral 108. In message 108, the value c is used to authenticate message 108 to S 102 and the value $h(c')$ is used by C 100 to authenticate a future message.

Next, S 102 uses the value of $Y_{sub.2}$ stored earlier and the value of $X_{sub.2}$ sent in message 108 to calculate $DHkey_2 = X_2^{y_2} \bmod p$. S 102 uses $DHkey_{sub.2}$ to decrypt message 108, obtaining $c, h(c')$ and $h(k(P'))$. S 102 generates Diffie-Hellman pair $(y_{sub.3}, Y_{sub.3})$. S 102 stores $y_{sub.3}, Y_3$ and $h(k(P'))$. S 102 authenticates C 100 by computing $h(c)$ and comparing it to the previous value of $h(c)$. If the two values are the same, S 102 knows that C 100 sent the message. At reference numeral 110, S 102 sends

Sid, $[s', Y_3]$ $DHkey_2$ (msg.110)
to C 100.

Upon receipt of message 110, C 100 uses $Dhkey_2$ to decrypt the message, obtaining s' and Y_3 . C 100 uses s' to authenticate S. C 100 stores Y_3 .

Trostle, column 6, lines 1-38.

Trostle teaches a different method and way of using Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. The cited portion of *Trostle* teaches using the Diffie-Hellman key to encrypt: a hash value of an encrypted new password, a hash value of a client-generated random value c' , a client-generated random value s' , and a client-generated random value c . Claims 1, 9, and 17 of the present invention recite that the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring a server-generated random value with a first hash. This first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and a client-generated random value. This digest of the client's userid and password is for the current/old password. In the claims of the present invention, the password is not changed until the client verifies a separate one-time authentication token from the server. The Examiner alleges that it would be obvious to one skilled in the art to combine the elements of known methods to achieve the claimed invention. Applicants respectfully disagree. *Peyravian* and *Trostle* each teach different methods for secure password communications. Applicants submit that it would not be obvious to choose and execute each of the steps in the manner or order as claimed in the present invention when presented with *Peyravian* and *Trostle*.

In addition, the present invention avoids the need for public-key or symmetric-key cryptosystems. In the present invention, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is used by the client and server to establish a shared secret to protect exchanges; and the method of the present invention does not use static or established Diffie-Hellman ephemerals between the client and sever. To the contrary, *Trostle*'s method uses two publicly known numbers: a prime number p and an integer g that is a primitive root of p . In addition, *Trostle* does not provide for the deficiencies of *Peyravian*. Thus, *Peyravian* and *Trostle*, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest these features.

Peyravian and *Trostle* fail to teach or suggest that "the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number

minus one; wherein the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value; wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server; wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server," as recited in independent claims 1, 9, and 17. Therefore, the alleged combination of *Peyravian* and *Trostle* does not teach or suggest these features.

In addition, the Final Office Action states that the "combined references of *Peyravian* and *Trostle* still do not explicitly teach sending a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and primitive root raised to a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one. The combined references also do not explicitly teach wherein the challenge token comprises a server generated random value XORed with a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client generated random value, and then have the server generate a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server, wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token."

In view of the above, the Examiner has not established a *prima facie* case of obviousness based on the prior art when rejecting claims 1, 9, and 17. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the rejection of claims 1, 9, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

/Gerald H. Glanzman/

Gerald H. Glanzman

Reg. No. 25,035

YEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

PO Box 802333

Dallas, TX 75380

(972) 385-8777

CLAIMS APPENDIX

The text of the claims involved in the appeal are:

1. A computer network, comprising:

a client and a server connected by a network connection, wherein the client has a userid and a password associated with the client;

wherein the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one;

wherein the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value;

wherein the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server;

wherein the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server;

wherein the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server;

wherein if the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result, and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server;

wherein the server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result, and wherein the server verifies the received message authentication code; and

wherein if the received message authentication code is verified, the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password.

9. A computer program product in a computer readable medium, comprising:

a client and a server connected by a network connection, wherein the client has a userid and a password associated with the client;

first instructions whereby the client requests access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one;

second instructions whereby the server responds to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends at least on a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and

password, and the client-generated random value;

third instructions whereby the client retrieves the server-generated random value from the challenge token and sends the server-generated random value and the userid to the server;

fourth instructions whereby the server verifies the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number, and if so, the server generates a one-time authentication token and sends it to the client, giving it permission to access the server;

fifth instructions whereby the client verifies the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server;

sixth instructions whereby if the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, the client changes the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result, and sending the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server;

seventh instructions whereby the server retrieves the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result, and wherein the server verifies the received message authentication code; and

eighth instructions whereby the server changes the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password if the received message authentication code is verified.

17. A method of authenticating a client with a server across a network connection,

comprising the steps of:

requesting, by the client, access to the server by sending a first set of values to the server, wherein the first set of values includes a client-generated random value, a large prime number, a primitive root of the large prime number, and the primitive root raised to a power of a large random integer less than the large prime number minus one;

responding, by the server, to the client by generating a one-time challenge token that depends on at least a server-generated random value and sending the challenge token to the client, wherein the server generates the challenge token by exclusive-oring the server-generated random value with a first hash, and wherein the first hash is a hash of the primitive root of the large prime number raised to a power, a digest of the client's userid and password, and the client-generated random value;

retrieving, by the client, the server-generated random value from the challenge token;

sending, by the client, the server-generated random value and a userid of the client to the server;

verifying, by the server, the received server-generated random value from the client is correct by comparing the server-generated random value received from the client with the server's stored value of the server-generated random number;

if the server-generated random value from the client is verified by the server, generating a one-time authentication token by the server;

sending, by the server, the one-time authentication token to the client to thereby give the client permission to access the server;

verifying, by the client, the validity of the one-time authentication token received from the server;

if the client verifies that the one-time authentication token from the server is valid, changing, by the client, the password by computing a hash of the userid and a new password to form a new digest, creating a mask, computing a message authentication code, and by exclusive-oring the mask with the new digest to form a result;

sending, by the client, the result, the userid, and the message authentication code to the server;

retrieving, by the server, the new digest by exclusive-oring the mask with the received result;

verifying, by the server, the received message authentication code; and

if the received message authentication code is verified, changing, by the server, the client password by replacing a digest of at least the old password with a digest of at least the new password.

EVIDENCE APPENDIX

There is no evidence to be presented.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX

There are no related proceedings.